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The Stability and Growth Pact is an 
agreement relating to fiscal policy among 
the member states of the EU. It refers to 
the third phase of the Economic and Mo-
netary Union (EMU), that is to irrevoca-
bly fixed exchange rates and the introduc-
tion of the single currency, the euro. Im-
plementation started on January 1, 1999, 
in order to make sure that the EMU mem-
ber states maintained fiscal discipline after 
the introduction of the euro, the single cu-
rrency. The member states that introduced 
the euro have to maintain the Maastricht 
convergence criteria, and the Stability and 
Growth Pact makes sure that these are en-
forced. States have to respect the following 
fiscal criteria:
•  General government budget deficit: the 
general government budget deficit expre-
ssed as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) must not exceed 3% as of 
the end of the preceding financial year. If 
this it is not possible, then the deficit can 
be temporarily above the 3% level, but 
must still be close to it.
•  The public debt: the gross general go-
vernment debt must not exceed 60% of 
GDP as of the end of the preceding fi-
nancial year. If this is not so, the propor-
tion of the debt must show a tendency to 
considerable reduction and must conver-
ge on the reference value with a satisfac-
tory dynamics. 
In a formal sense, the Pact was adop-
ted by a resolution of the European Coun-
cil (in Amsterdam, June 17, 1997) and with 
two regulations of the Council of July 7, 
1997, which elaborated in detail the tech-
nical specificities of the pact from the point 
of view of supervising the budgetary items 
and the coordination of economic policies 
if an excessive deficit should arise. 
In the EU, economic policy is charac-
terised by a centralised monetary policy 
that is in the remit of the European Central 
Bank – ECB, and a decentralised fiscal po-
licy, which remains within the jurisdiction 
of the national governments of the member 
states. Healthy government finances contri-
bute to the achievement and maintenance 
of price stability and hence of sustainable 
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economic growth. Hence common rules for 
the running of fiscal policies at national le-
vels are defined and established at EU level. 
These rules were incorporated into the pro-
visions of the Treaty on European Unity at 
Maastricht in 1992, and, particularly, in the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and relate to fis-
cal criteria – the size of the budgetary de-
ficit and of the public debt – that member 
countries must satisfy in order to be able to 
introduce the euro as the national currency, 
or to achieve and maintain stable positions 
within the EMU.
The Stability and Growth Pact was ini-
tially proposed by German finance minister 
Theo Waigel in the mid-1990s. For many 
years Germany had maintained high rates 
of growth concurrently with a low inflation 
and expected that it would be able to ensu-
re the continuation of such a policy by the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, which would limit the contribution of 
the member states to inflationary pressures 
in the European economy.
In the mid-term the member states un-
dertook measures to balance their budgets 
and by March 1, 1999, had presented sta-
bilisation programmes to the Council and 
the Commission; these programmes were 
supplemented each following year. Coun-
tries that were not members of the EMU 
third phase, i.e., those that had not intro-
duced the euro, had to submit convergen-
ce programmes.
The Stability and Growth Pact enables 
the Council to penalise every member state 
that does not undertake appropriate measu-
res in order to reduce excessive deficits (the 
excessive deficit procedure as it is called). 
Penalty measures have at the beginning the 
form of a non-interest-bearing deposit that 
can be turned into a fine if the deficit is not 
corrected in a period of two years. But there 
are no fixed rules to govern these penalty 
measures. They are on the whole a matter of 
the Council’s subjective assessment about 
the circumstances in the origin of an exce-
ssive deficit. 
The Pact has been criticised much for 
not being flexible enough and for being 
applied only to a single year and not over 
the whole of the economic cycle. There is 
some fear that constraints on public spen-
ding during economic crises could have a 
bad effect on the growth in member states.
Apart from this, the Pact has been en-
forced very inconsistently. In 2003 the Co-
uncil of Ministers did not invoke the pe-
nalty provisions with respect to France and 
Germany when they were in difficulties. 
This was the culmination of several years 
of major issues in the introduction of the 
Pact and showed that one of the major pro-
blems in it was its weak enforceability. The 
Pact has been shown impossible to apply to 
the big countries, such as France and Ger-
many, which were actually the main gene-
rators of the agreement, but which tend, 
because of their size and political influen-
ce, to be spared if they do offend against 
the Pact’s provisions. For according to the 
Pact’s definitions, these were countries that 
did have excessive deficits, and yet were 
not penalised.
Accepting these criticisms, in 2005 the 
Council softened the rules of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The fundamental feature 
of the Pact is that the quantitative constra-
ints of the original Pact – the budgetary de-
ficit of 3% of GDP and the public debt of at 
most 60% of GDP – remained unchanged. 
However, the definition and implementati-
on of the rules of the Pact have become so-
mewhat different, more flexible. The first 
departure is that budgetary objectives will 
be reviewed every fourth year. A second 
new departure is that countries with a low 
public debt and a high growth potential will 
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be allowed a budgetary deficit of 1% of 
GDP in the medium term. Highly indebted 
countries with a low potential growth have 
to aim for a balanced budget or even a sur-
plus. Countries with a public debt greater 
than 100% of GDP will be asked to aim at 
a budgetary surplus. Also among the main 
elements of reform is the requirement for 
the strengthening of fiscal positions during 
good years, such good years being under-
stood as those in which GDP is above the 
potential level. It is anticipated that in these 
years countries will reduce their potential 
deficit by 0.5 GDP percentage points.
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